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ABSTRACT 
International Political Economy (IPE) textbooks tend to present the concept of a 
clear state-market dichotomy as the disciplinary mainstream. Yet we argue that a 
critical consensus has emerged around the mutual constitution of states and markets. 
Underpinning this is the Polanyian thesis that economic activities are always 
politically embedded. However, we claim that this notion of state-market mutual 
constitution is inadequate to grasp the peculiarities of the capitalist political 
economy. While capitalist market relations are underpinned by states, they take on 
an autonomous, dominating logic that limits states’ agency. Concretely, by 
reproducing international monetary relations, states accidentally contribute to the 
establishment of world labour productivity averages that force them to boost 
national competitiveness in order to keep pace with world market standards. In 
place of the notion of mutual constitution, then, we offer Marx’s concept of 
alienation as a theory of a form of social relations that have escaped the control of 
the institutions that produce them. The challenge of state governance – reflected in 
the canon of liberal thought – is to reconcile the impersonal imperatives of world 
market relations with the creation of a legitimate national political project, which 
we term the politics of governing alienation. 
 






Ravenhill’s popular textbook defines the ‘central focus’ of International Political Economy 
(IPE) as ‘the interrelationship between public and private power in the allocation of scarce 
resources’ (Ravenhill, 2017, p.21). While the emphasis on scarcity is not universally shared, it 
is widely accepted that the relationship between the public and private spheres is the stuff of 
IPE. As Watson (2005, p.21) writes, ‘most contributions to the IPE literature have been couched 
in terms of the causal relationship between one entity called “states” and another one called 
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“markets”’. While only the most traditional approaches frame states and markets as embroiled 
in a ‘tug of war wherein more market equals less state’ – as early interventions in IPE’s 
‘globalisation debate’ argued – it is still supposedly commonplace to conceptualise the public 
and private as strictly separate realms (Clift, 2014, p.168). Indeed, as Bruff (2011, p.84) argues, 
‘it is not just the more mainstream contributions that deploy a state/market dichotomy, but also 
self-professed critical perspectives’. According to this widespread self-understanding, IPE is 
still fundamentally defined by a dualistic approach to states and markets.  
 We contend that this characterisation is outdated. Within IPE, there is growing 
agreement that ‘market systems and political systems are co-constitutive’ (Broome, 2014, p. 
12). While the notion of a strict state-market divide is often held up as the IPE mainstream, 
against which theories of political/economic co-constitutiveness are presented as a radical 
counter-current, we argue that a kind of critical consensus has emerged around the concept of 
the mutual constitution of states and markets. This approach encompasses a diverse array of 
IPE interventions – including feminist and post/decolonial traditions, which have drawn 
attention to how market phenomena are enmeshed within gendered and racialised political 
structures (Bakker and Silvey, 2008; Elias and Roberts, 2018; Tilley and Shilliam, 2018). The 
mutual constitution thesis highlight the state’s role in underpinning market developments by 
demonstrating the entwinement of markets in domestic institutional, ideational, and politico-
legal structures. Within this literature, many key interventions draw specifically from Polanyi’s 
concept of embeddedness (Cohen, 2008, p.116). As Block and Somers (2014, p.37) write, 
Polanyi’s innovation was to insist that markets ‘are neither natural nor autonomous, but they 
are deeply embedded within the state’s exercise of power and authority’. States do not intervene 
at the expense of markets, but rather markets only exist because states produce and regulate 
them. While this is certainly true, within contemporary IPE this insight is ‘all too often … taken 
as the conclusion rather than the beginning of analysis’ (Burnham, 2011, p.478). The claim that 
political and economic authority jointly constitute all human social reality risks slipping into 
banality if it is not further developed into a theory of capitalism’s historically unique dynamics.  
This article insists that IPE’s mutual constitution approach fails to grasp how the 
capitalist market both depends entirely upon states and yet simultaneously constitutes an 
automatic social logic that imposes itself back upon states. Drawing from the ‘value form’ 
reading of Marx’s work (see Pitts, 2019), we propose that Marx’s concept of alienation is better 
suited to grasp this double reality. By forging and reproducing capitalist money relations 
domestically and through international monetary systems, states accidentally produce a global 
dynamic of economic competition over labour time that subordinates them to its dictates. 
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Money is the central nervous system that transmits changes in labour productivity in one part 
of society to the other, promising economic ruination for firms if this new standard cannot be 
matched (Rubin, 1973). While the construction and maintenance of this monetary system are 
‘matters of state’, such market-making unleashes an autonomous logic of its own (Bonefeld, 
2014, p.182). Alienation, then, denotes not just a feeling of estrangement, but the actual loss of 
control by political institutions over the social relations that they create (Postone, 1993, p.159). 
The challenge that states face in managing this system of perpetual competition, we argue, can 
be understood as the contradictory politics of governing alienation: states must navigate a path 
between disciplining domestic social relations in line with global market averages, so as to 
maintain the national economy’s viability, and postponing these competitive pressures to ensure 
domestic social stability. The mutual constitution approach fails to capture the runaway 
dynamic of capitalist development, whereby states unconsciously produce an alienated logic 
that escapes their control. Further, its one-sided emphasis on the market-making function of 
states misses the contradictory nature of the governance of alienation. 
We begin by discussing the different varieties of the IPE mutual constitution thesis. 
During the ‘globalisation debate’, certain scholars insisted that economic globalisation did not 
entail the state’s retreat, but rather a transformation and even expansion of state activities. 
Central to many of these accounts was the Polanyian-inspired notion that market activity is 
always embedded in political institutions and ideational norms. Next, we examine the 
shortcomings of the mutual constitution approach. While the latter tends to posit market 
embeddedness and disembeddedness as mutually exclusive conditions, we argue that capitalist 
markets are simultaneously rooted in political, social, and cultural institutions and characterised 
by an automatic logic. This article then explores the politics of the state’s governance of this 
alienated social dynamic. We claim that both neoliberal and Keynesian strands of liberal 
thought are useful, though partial, lenses for understanding how states are forced to enact both 
economic discipline and palliative measures in order to manage the contradictory forces of 
world market competition and national legitimacy concerns.  
 
Varieties of mutual constitution 
 
The notion that states and markets together constitute an interwoven social whole is older than 
the field of IPE itself. Nevertheless, within the disciplinary boundaries of IPE proper, the most 
sustained discussion of state-market mutual constitution emerged from the ‘globalisation 
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debate’. This debate was concerned with the globalisation of economic relations following the 
demise of the Bretton Woods system, and the implications for states’ capacities to govern 
(Mittelman, 2000; Cameron and Palan, 2004; Phillips, 2005). The first salvo of this debate was 
fired by ‘globalist’ accounts, which insisted on the contemporary state’s ‘retreat’ (Strange, 
1996) or ‘withering away’ (Held, 1995) in the face of unrestricted global capital flows. Such 
accounts were underpinned by an understanding of states and markets as engaged in a zero-sum 
power struggle (Sørensen, 2004). One important response to this dichotomous understanding 
of states and markets was the ‘competition state’ approach (Cerny, 1997; Jessop, 2003; Hirsch, 
1997). This approach argued that, confronted by economic globalisation, states do not retreat, 
but increasingly ‘internalise’ the market’s competitive logic, prioritising the national 
economy’s ‘enterprise, innovation and profitability’ over the provision of domestic social 
solidarity (Cerny, 1997, p.260). By arguing that through the process of globalisation ‘the 
frontiers between state and market become blurred’, the competition state approach pointed 
towards the co-constitution of political and economic activity (Cerny, ibid, p.267). Yet a more 
thorough mutual constitution approach would emerge later in the globalisation debate from IPE 
scholars drawing from the concept of embeddedness first proposed by Polanyi.  
The mutual constitution thesis, we argue, is emblematic of the ‘Polanyian turn’ in IPE, 
which has endeavoured to unveil the interventionist state powers that underpin the neoliberal 
market (Knafo, 2020). Directly or indirectly, the mutual constitution thesis is inspired by the 
notion of embeddedness, as it seeks to highlight the interpenetration of political, institutional, 
and economic processes. Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness has been the subject of various 
interpretations, from Granovetter’s (1985) emphasis on the embeddedness of agents’ economic 
behaviour in networks of social relations, to Block’s (2003) holistic view of the ‘always 
embedded economy’, which contends that no economic system can ever be detached from its 
cultural and social context. IPE mutual constitution accounts draw inspiration from Polanyi and 
the concept of embeddedness in order to counter the globalist approach’s rigid state-market 
dichotomy by instead affirming their interwoven relation (Amoore, 2002, p.49; Cohen, 2008, 
p.116; Holmes, 2018, p.21). 
Within the globalisation debate, the field of Comparative Political Economy (CPE) 
disputed the institutional convergence in the face of globalisation assumed by existing accounts 
and instead laid emphasis on the national variations in states’ adaptations to economic change 
(Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Hall and Sosckice, 2001; 
Campbell, 2004; Amable, 2003). CPE espouses the basic tenet of the Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC) school, namely that globalisation leads to differentiated adaptations, rather than 
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homogenisation, as national political economies respond to external developments by building 
upon the peculiar characteristics of their domestic institutional set-up of market relations (Hall 
and Sosckice, 2001; Hancké, 2009, p.4). Whether in its Granovetterian or Polanyian guise, CPE 
is influenced by the concept of embeddedness (Clift, 2014, p.209; Jackson and Deeg, 2008 
p.683; Peck and Theodore, 2007, p.751). More precisely, the comparative tradition is premised 
upon a notion of ‘institutional embeddedness’, whereby market agents always operate within a 
given social and institutional context which ultimately conditions their economic strategies 
(Weiss, 2010, p.183). Despite the international economic challenges common to all states, CPE 
shows that states’ adaptation to liberalisation pressures cannot be extricated from the 
institutionally mediated compromises and political negotiations within the domestic social 
order (Amable, 2003, 2017, pp.3-9; Hancké et al., 2007, pp.19-23; Hall and Thelen, 2009).  
While CPE approaches do not equally focus on state-market relations – the state’s role 
being conspicuously absent in VoC accounts (Clift, 2014, p.201) – their portrayal of 
globalisation as a source of cross-national diversity suggests that economic change is always 
‘institutionally conditioned’ (Hall, 2007, p.76), rather than imposed by global markets in a 
disciplinary manner. Other CPE scholars are keener to emphasise the state’s role in giving birth 
to different national breeds of capitalism (Levy et al, 2006; Molina and Rhodes, 2007; Jackson 
and Deeg, 2008, pp.699-700; Schmidt, 2009). In this vein, as domestic political traditions and 
patterns of state action are imprinted on nations’ diverse trajectories of economic adjustment, 
the state is revealed to do far more than mechanistically internalise external market imperatives 
(Vail, 2018). In fact, the comparative approach highlights that states have a ‘market-making 
and market-shaping’ capacity that varies nationally, pointing to the intertwined relationship 
between states and markets (Clift and Woll, 2012, p.310). 
Constructivist approaches concur in viewing states and global markets as ‘mutually 
constitutive’ (Geske, 2000). Their co-constitutiveness is emphasised through the role of 
ideational factors in shaping economic trajectories (Blyth, 2013; Seabrooke, 2007; Cameron 
and Palan, 2004). Indeed, markets are not autonomous, insofar as they are endowed with 
meaning and purpose by political agents (Abdelal, 2009). Often building on Polanyi’s critique 
of laissez-faire, such approaches highlight that the separation of market and state relies on an 
(neoliberal) ideational ‘fiction’ (Maucourant and Plociniczak, 2013; Peck, 2010). As such, 
different market-making practices, from neoliberal to social-democratic, can be viewed through 
the concept of ‘ideational embeddedness’, which denotes the way that ideological paradigms 
‘shape, structure, and change market regimes’ (Somers and Block, 2005, p.260).  
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Ideational embeddedness chimes well with the insights of so-called third wave 
globalisation theory (see Bruff, 2005; Berry, 2011). For this school it is political agents’ 
interpretation of globalisation, not globalisation itself, that leads to specific policy outcomes, 
such as trade/financial liberalisation (Lister and Marsh, 2006). For instance, policy-makers may 
appeal to subjective understandings of globalisation as a structural constraint in order to 
implement contingent neoliberal policy preferences (Hay and Rosamond, 2002; Watson and 
Hay, 2003). It is policy-makers’ ‘cognitive perceptions’ of conjectural economic phenomena 
that frame institutional responses to market developments, as opposed to global market forces 
(Blyth, 2001, 2002; Abdelal, Blyth, and Parson, 2009; Campbell, 2004). From this standpoint, 
state-market relations are ‘discursively’ constructed – it is not out-of-control markets that 
predetermine state policy but ‘[t]he believed-in myth of disembedded markets’ (Caporaso and 
Tarrow, 2009, p.596, our emphasis; see also Hay, 2002.  
While certain comparative and constructivist mutual constitution accounts have made 
indirect overtures to Polanyian thought by adding an institutionalist or ideational twist to the 
concept of embeddedness, the mutual constitution thesis has found its most radical defenders 
in approaches that directly draw from a Polanyian notion of embeddedness. Such approaches 
follow Polanyi’s proposition that the economy, market or otherwise, is always ‘enmeshed in 
institutions, economic and noneconomic’ (Polanyi, 1957, p.250; see Gemici, 2008). As opposed 
to an autonomous sphere, the market is seen as an organic part of a wider social whole (Block 
and Somers, 1984; Block, 2001, p.xxiii). The market’s functioning is not reducible to the 
economic transactions between atomised, rational individuals, but is inevitably entangled in a 
larger web of non-economic relations and reflects the legal, cultural, and political arrangements 
of a given society (Barber, 1995; Krippner, 2001).  
The neo-Polanyian understanding of the economy as ‘always embedded’ (Block, 2003; 
Barber, 1995) radically departs from the analytical dichotomisation of the political and 
economic into distinct spheres of social organisation and instead highlights the ‘mutual 
constitution of state and economy’ (Block and Evans, 2005, p.506; Krippner and Alvarez, 2007, 
p.233). Instead of disciplining states, markets are dependent upon constant state intervention to 
regulate labour, land, and money – the ‘fictitious commodities’ that, absent political regulation, 
would not be traded on markets (Block, 2003, p.282). As Polanyian thought reveals, the state 
is tasked with a ‘market-making’ role (Levy, 2006, p.44), since markets are ‘ultimately created 
and sustained through the mechanisms of the state’ (Underhill and Zhang, 2005, p.8). 
Underhill’s concept of the ‘state market condominium’ captures well the embedded view of the 
global economy, as global governance is interpreted not as belonging exclusively to the market 
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or state sphere, but as constituting an organic whole formed by the mutually exerted influence 
of both political and economic agents (Underhill, 2000). 
Thus, from a neo-Polanyian perspective, the era of neoliberal globalisation has not 
heralded the transition from a system of market embeddedness to a generalised retrenchment of 
the state’s interventionist powers. Neoliberalism simply represents a different articulation of 
embeddedness (Cahill, 2014; Vogel, 2018, p.133). The neoliberal economy remains embedded 
in a historically specific constellation of ideological paradigms, institutional arrangements, and 
balances of class forces (Cahill, 2018). Concretely, the deregulation of financial and labour 
markets does not signal state retreat, but the emergence of a qualitatively altered form of 
political management of these spheres (Krippner, 2007; Block, 2007). Fundamentally, for neo-
Polanyian IPE, no project of installing a self-regulating market, such as neoliberalism, can ever 
prove successful. Drawing from Polanyi’s notion of the double movement, it is suggested that 
the countermovement, or society’s resistance to the market’s dislocating effects, poses obstacles 
to full economic liberalisation and forces the state to deploy regulatory means that guarantee 
‘some threshold level of embeddedness’ (Block and Somers, 2014, p.93; see also Porter and 
Craig, 2004; Sandbrook, 2014).       
While neo-Polanyian IPE goes to great lengths to demonstrate the fully embedded 
character of markets, an alternative, critical reading of Polanyi’s work contests the applicability 
of ‘embeddedness’ to capitalism. Lacher (2019) shows that the concept of the ‘always 
embedded economy’ obscures the central novelty of Polanyi’s thought, which sought to 
demonstrate that the market’s self-regulating logic was incompatible with attempts to embed 
the economy by placing it under social control. This ‘hard’ reading of Polanyi contrasts with 
the ‘soft’ interpretation of neo-Polanyian IPE (see Dale, 2016; Goodwin, 2018), as it draws 
attention to the market’s disembedding tendencies: while in pre-capitalist societies economic 
activity was fixed within existing social conventions, the capitalist market is characterised by 
an historically novel organising principle, whereby different social activities are subordinated 
to the market’s autonomised logic (Cangiani, 2017). This interpretation crucially distinguishes 
between the instituted and embedded character of economies. While the former suggests that 
every society institutionalises, in different ways, its production and distribution, the latter 
essentially refers to the blending of the economic with other social spheres (Harvey, 2007, 
p.165; Machado, 2011, p.136). Disembeddedness connotes that society is effectively 
subordinated to the market’s price mechanism, as the worth of goods, land, and incomes is 
automatically dictated by fluctuations in supply and demand, rather than directly administered 
by social actors (Machado, 2011). Although socially instituted, the capitalist market escapes 
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the conscious control of its creators and imposes its own rationality upon society, according to 
this reading. As Dale (2010, p.202) puts it, ‘that the liberal market is “embedded” in the sense 
of “instituted”… does not negate its “disembeddedness” at other levels’.  
The critique of the soft Polanyi can be levelled to the mutual constitution thesis as a 
whole. The varieties of mutual constitution discussed here –  the ‘institutionally conditioned’ 
economy, the ideational construction of market regimes, and the ‘always embedded market’ – 
suggest that states are internally related to markets and actively integrate their economies into 
the global scale in varying, politically embedded ways. However, if the full implications of the 
state’s market-making role are considered, then it could be argued that although market activity 
is undergirded by state authority, the motion of the market may escape political control and 
inadvertently tie the state’s hands. As we contend, the mutual constitution of states and markets 
begets their mutual subordination to the disciplinary logic of capitalist competition.  
 
From mutual constitution to alienation 
 
The IPE literature on state-market relations presents a binary of possibilities: either the market 
becomes disembedded and escapes its anchoring in social relations, as early globalist accounts 
suggested, or the market is embedded in a matrix of socio-political relations and thus politics 
predominates, as the mutual constitution thesis argues. However, as alluded to above, the hard 
reading of Polanyi suggests that market society’s historical novelty lies in its double-sidedness, 
as the economy is both socially engineered and constitutes a disembedded force that dominates 
all other social spheres.  
In this section, we argue that this double reality, unique to capitalism, is best captured 
by Marx’s writings on alienation. Although Block (2003) emphatically stresses the 
incompatibility of Marx’s theory and the ‘always embedded’ account of state-economy 
relations, others have noted the similarities between the hard interpretation of Polanyi and 
Marx’s account of capitalism as an economic system that, although socially constituted, 
subjects socio-cultural institutions to its own logic of reproduction (Cangiani 2011, p.198; Dale 
2011, p.333). More precisely, the concept of alienation transcends the embedded/disembedded 
dichotomy by expressing how people collectively produce an economic system that in turn 
disciplines them. Markets depend for their functioning upon cultural norms, forms of 
knowledge, and performative acts. Further, states undergird every moment in the circuit of 
capital, forging the legal framework for market transactions, policing the cultural forms that 
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support the market’s operation, and governing money. Yet capitalism also escapes the control 
of the participants that give it life and imposes itself back upon them as an impersonal force. In 
making this argument, we draw from the value-form Marxist tradition that scrutinises the 
historically-specific social forms that constitute capitalist society – particularly monetary 
exchange as the form of capitalist socialisation – and the manner in which these forms acquire 
a self-reproducing logic that dominates the lives of the very individuals that create them (Pitts, 
2019; Bonefeld, 2014; Postone, 1993). Applied to the study of state-market relations, the value-
form interpretation of alienation suggests that it is the role of money in mediating the social 
productivity of labour that explains how the market both depends upon state interventionism 
and exerts a disciplining force over economic policy. 
 
Money and alienation in the global market  
 
The role of alienation in Marx’s theoretical system has been a source of controversy since the 
1932 publication of his Paris Manuscripts (Musto, 2010, p.82). Here, Marx argued that 
workers’ alienation in capitalism had four aspects: alienation from the product of their labour, 
the labour process itself, their fellow human beings, and their very ‘species-being’ (Marx, 
1992). This argument has been interpreted in various ways. A common reading states that 
alienation must be understood as an experiential category: as a violence wrought upon workers’ 
subjectivities under capitalism (see Fromm, 2013). For Althusser (2005), such subjectivism was 
a characteristic of Marx’s early ‘humanist’ writings that preceded his later ‘scientific’ work (i.e. 
Capital). Yet this notion was roundly critiqued by scholars such as Mészáros (1970) and Ollman 
(1971), who argued that alienation remained a central principle of Marx’s mature critique of 
political economy. For Mészáros, alienation under capitalism is closely tied to the institution of 
private property, which transforms humans’ metabolic interaction with nature into a tool of 
class oppression; while for Ollman, alienation results from the division of labour, which reaches 
its most advanced stage in capitalist society (Clarke, 1991, p.69-71).  
 However, for several authors within the value-form tradition, Marx neither abandons 
alienation in his later writings nor uses it in the same way throughout his work. Instead, as 
Heinrich (2016, p.96) writes, Marx develops alienation from a theory of individual 
dehumanisation to a general theory of ‘the inability of humans to control the social relations 
they produce’ (see also Rubin, 1973). According to this reading, which this article adopts, 
people do not simply feel alienated because the products of their labour are appropriated by 
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capitalists nor because of the monotony of divided labour. They are alienated because their 
social universe is regulated by an automatic social mechanism that they have accidentally 
created but cannot reign in (Postone, 1993, p.159). As Smith (1993, p.126) explains, ‘the whole 
of Capital can be read as an extended analysis of a phenomenon of “objective alienation”’, that 
is, ‘the alienation of human beings from a condition of mastery over their affairs’. The root 
cause of this historically unique form of collective alienation can be found in the capitalist mode 
of human socialisation, namely money-mediated commodity exchange. 
Money has existed since antiquity, performing a variety of economic as well as 
ceremonial, religious, and political functions (Davies, 2002). Indeed, the Roman Empire 
boasted an advanced monetary system, with currency circulating within its ‘vast domains’ and 
‘beyond the imperial boundaries’ for the purposes of facilitating trade, extracting tributes, and 
paying armies (ibid, p.90). Yet this monetary complexity ‘constituted a thin veneer of 
sophistication’ over what was a chiefly subsistence economy – the great majority of Roman 
labourers were peasants who produced directly for their own consumption (Hopkins, 1980, 
p.104). Money performs a very different role in capitalist society due to the universalisation of 
market dependence (Wood, 2002). In a system in which specialised private producers are 
formally independent of one another and the majority of the population are denied direct access 
to what they need to survive, money constitutes the ‘connecting link’ between atomised 
individuals and allows for the formation of a single ‘unified system’ (Rubin, 1973, pp.7-10). 
Capitalist money can purchase any sort of product or service, regardless of its corporeal 
qualities, as long as it has a price tag. Qualitatively distinct kinds of labour are rendered equal 
in the eyes of money as, through its lens, every good is regarded as the product of 
‘undifferentiated human labour’ (Marx, 1976, p.204). In other words, the products of different 
working activities are ‘homogenised’ and become distinguishable only by the price they obtain 
on the market (Saad-Filho, 2019, p.53). Money guarantees the exchangeability of commodities, 
by performing the role of a ‘universally understood language’ (Simmel, 2010, p.4), with prices 
being the ‘money-names’ it attributes to different saleable goods (Marx, 1976, p.195). Indeed, 
the ‘impersonality and colourlessness’ of money allows the objective commensuration of 
different products by establishing different quantitative relations of equivalence between them, 
expressed in prices (Simmel, 1991, p.19). By stripping goods of their physical qualities, money 
relations essentially represent the relationship between different quantities of labour time 
(Rubin, 1973, p.156).  
However, it is not the labour time expended in individual workplaces that determines 
the value of different sectoral products, but the average time that companies within the whole 
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market nexus expend for their production (Heinrich, 2012, p.51). What Marx termed ‘socially 
necessary labour time’ (1976, p.129) constitutes the ‘external yardstick’ that communicates the 
economic worth of individual products and coordinates an otherwise decentralised and privately 
conducted system of production (Marx, 1993, p.269). The different production methods and 
technologies deployed by existing firms to expand their market shares give rise to average 
productivity standards, which money translates into benchmark prices that must be matched to 
profitably compete within the market. By participating in commodity exchange, individual 
producers are submitted ‘to the test of the market’ (Clarke, 1991, p.107), as their solvency 
depends on their ability to abide by average productivity levels (McNally, 1993, p.179). 
Capitalist exchange thus generates a compelling market norm that escapes the control of 
participating agents and instead dominates them as a matter of market survival (Tombazos, 
2013). 
In a way, market competition concretises the adage that ‘time is money’ (Lotz, 2014, 
p.55). For individual companies, realising their products’ full latent value hinges upon their 
capacity to produce ‘within time’ by bringing production costs below prevailing market prices 
(Bonefeld, 2010, p.269). The dynamism of this system owes to the mechanism of competition, 
as general increases in productivity are experienced by individual producers as an external 
constraint to which they must conform ‘under penalty of ruin’ (Marx, 1981, p.353). Although 
socially constituted, capitalist exchange ultimately gives rise to an abstract and ‘temporal form 
of domination’, as the viability of firms rests on their positioning in relation to the average 
productivity levels that they themselves contribute to (Postone, 2015, p.14). The historically 
specific form of socialisation under capitalism generates an economic logic that is alienated 
from the wider social whole. 
The alienating features of capitalist exchange are further amplified by the fact that the 
market validation of firms’ productivity operates on a global scale (Bonefeld, 2014). Indeed, 
the compelling productivity norms described by Marx are essentially a world market 
phenomenon, as the measure of value is not established nationally, ‘but by the average 
necessary time of labour on the world market’ (Marx, 2010, p.384, emphasis in original). 
Socially necessary labour time, in a sense, ‘dictates the pace’, as the commensuration of 
commodities on the world market gives rise to global productivity and price standards (Tomba, 
2012, p.168). There is a distributive logic within the world market that operates quasi-
automatically, as it allots low, average, or high profits to individual capitals depending on 
whether they fall behind, match, or supersede average productivity levels. 
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This competitive mechanism gives rise to uneven rates of development between and 
within national geographical spaces (Smith, 2010), as advanced producers leading the race 
indirectly force less developed ones to catch-up and reach the productivity frontier they set 
(Barker, 2006). Take, for example, the ‘premature deindustrialisation’ experienced by low- and 
middle-income countries in the Global South (see Rodrik, 2016; Dasgupta and Singh, 2006). In 
the Global North, deindustrialisation, commonly defined as the declining share of industrial 
employment, resulted from the so-called ‘economic maturation’ of societies, whereby growing 
manufacturing productivity and the relative stagnation of demand for manufactures rendered a 
great share of industrial labour progressively redundant (see Rowthorn and Wells, 1987). 
Countries in the Global South, however, deindustrialise not because they have achieved the 
same industrial maturity. Their premature deindustrialisation is largely due to the massive 
productivity increases in global manufacturing and the consequent decline in prices achieved 
by advanced nations or late-industrialisers such as China, which now ‘discourag[e] newcomers 
in developing countries from entry’ (Rodrik, 2015, p.8). Thus, the interplay of decreasing 
production times and international competition raises the productivity frontier one must reach 
to be profitable on the world market. 
In sum, money is both a socialising bond uniting private firms and consumers in the 
world market and an alienating social technology subjecting market agents to the tyranny of 
global productivity averages. 
 
Between market-making and impersonal domination 
 
Just as individual market actors contribute to the creation of productivity norms that 
inadvertently end up dominating them, so too individual states construct the conditions of global 
market competition over which, once established, they lose control to a great extent.  
Within the domestic market, the competitive commensuration of different goods would 
be impossible without the state’s authority to print and establish a ‘mandatory currency 
benchmark’ as the medium of exchange (Brunhoff, 2003, p.45). Concurrently, by interlocking 
their national currencies in the foreign exchange market, states jointly give rise to a system of 
global market commensuration, as exchange rates operate ‘like the eye of a needle through 
which prices of all domestic goods and services are linked and compared with the prices of 
foreign output’ (Cohen, 2015, p.62). Hence, it is states that spur the race over global 
productivity averages, as exchange rates enable the comparison of domestically operating 
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firms’ productivity relative to world market conditions (Kettell, 2004). At the same time, by 
entangling domestic currencies within the web of world monies, states subject themselves to 
the temporal dynamic of global competition (Clarke, 1988). For states, failure to match global 
productivity standards translates into various forms of crisis, such as financial downgrading, 
balance of payment deficits, capital flight, speculative attacks on currencies etc., which call for 
corrective measures to enhance domestic productivity (Bonefeld, 2000, p.38). Although the 
unfolding of global market dynamics relies on state authority, the market also constitutes the 
terrain of the state’s own domination. 
On the one hand, then, the state indeed has a market-making role, as suggested by the 
mutual constitution approach. In fact, the market’s functioning relies on certain guarantees that 
it cannot, by itself, provide, such as a readily employable labour force or a trusted currency 
functioning as the official medium of circulation. As noted by Polanyi (2001), labour and 
money are ‘fictitious commodities’ whose existence as saleable artefacts owes to state-enforced 
institutional and legal arrangements (Cahill, 2014, p.71). This is further supported by Chartalist 
theories of money, according to which the latter is ‘a creature of the state’ (Lerner, 1947). For 
such accounts, money emerges not from the spontaneous need of market actors for a neutral 
exchange medium, but from states’ enforcement of a standardised accounting unit to measure 
the debt/tax obligations of its subjects (see Knapp, 1924). The emergence of national currencies 
has historically been ‘an intensely political process’ that states initiated to both accommodate 
their own financial needs and to forge national markets (Helleiner, 2003, p.2). Thus, the 
(re)production of markets relies on states’ political authority and, in this sense, markets can be 
understood as politically instituted. 
On the other hand, however, the state’s market-making role constitutes the source of its 
own alienation, as money is simultaneously state-crafted and state-disciplining. Although 
money and markets are state creations, they acquire dynamics that discipline state behaviour. 
In 17th-18th century Britain, modern state-finance relations were born out of the state’s necessity 
to wage its imperial wars (Clapham, 1966). Indeed, the state-founded and privately-managed 
Bank of England assisted the state’s war efforts in return for future interest repayments financed 
out of taxation, and in the process issued and re-traded notes representing state debt on 
secondary markets (McNally, 2014, pp.13-14). Although state-enacted, this process 
increasingly subjected public finances to international financial markets, as the viability of state 
debt rested on their verdict (McNally, 2014, p.25). The making of markets and money are 
fundamentally state-led exercises, but economic policy becomes, in turn, shaped, altered, and 
regimented by the state’s own creations. Money-making is a ‘limited power’, as the state fails 
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to control the full context in which money operates, such as the sentiment of financial markets, 
the strategic actions of other states, international capital flows etc. (Beggs, 2017, p.470). That 
the state creates money is not enough; it must subsequently ‘act strategically in or upon the 
market situation’ in order to defend its international value (Beggs, 2017, p.472). While an 
essential precondition for the functioning of markets, the state’s management of money 
effectively reproduces the ‘market-based constraints on policy-making’ (Brunhoff, 1978, p.82). 
The world market’s disciplinary effects are not evenly exercised across the globe, as the 
Global South is more vulnerable to violent fluctuations in capital markets (Alami, 2018). In 
fact, the world economy is characterised by an uneven distribution of monetary power, leading 
to ‘hierarchies in monetary relations’ (Cohen, 2015). In the face of balance of payments 
disequilibria, countries at the top of the chain can rely on their access to global credit or their 
pool of foreign reserves to defend their currency’s value and delay the costs of domestic 
adjustment (Cohen, 2015). Countries issuing the preeminent global reserve currency, such as 
the United States today, enjoy ‘exorbitant privilege’ in this sense (Eichengreen, 2011). These 
hierarchies constitute temporary pecking orders in a wider competitive system, in which power 
is exercised heteronomously and experienced unevenly across national economies. The 
monetary power of different countries describes the degree of manoeuvre that individual states 
have in responding to the impersonal force of global competition. While states might appear to 
loosen the pressures of competition, they ‘certainly [do] not eliminate these constraints’, but 
merely find a way to temporarily navigate them without immediate sanctions (Brunhoff, 1978, 
p.93). 
The complicity of states in reproducing an alienated system of global competition bears 
crucial implications for IPE. Mutual constitution approaches have essentially strived to find a 
balance between the agential power of the state and the structural forces of the market. This 
endeavour has its limitations, as it remains unclear ‘who or what actually exercises authority’ 
(Cohen, 2007, p.117). The struggles encountered by IPE in answering this question stems from 
its traditional understanding of power ‘as an entity that is held, plotted or wielded’ by certain 
political or economic institutions, instead of a fundamentally more abstract phenomenon 
(Amoore, 2002, p.59). Thus, mutual constitution approaches fail to consider that power in the 
global economy may be located neither in the state nor the market realm, nor simply shared 
amongst them, but instead impersonally exercised on both state and market actors. Our value-
informed approach seeks not to find the correct balance between state and market authority, but 
to demonstrate that the mutual constitution of states and markets creates ‘an alien social power’ 
that mutually subordinates them to the temporal dynamic of capitalist competition (Marx, 1993, 
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p.197, emphasis in original). By creating and reproducing markets, states submit themselves to 
the fugitive logic of capitalist exchange, which compels them to defend national productivity 
in the face of global averages for the sake of their own institutional survival. 
 
The politics of governing alienation 
 
This article has argued that IPE can better grasp capitalist dynamics by shifting from a framing 
of state-market interaction in terms of mutual constitution to exploring how states accidentally 
produce an alienated logic of competition that in turn dominates them. In this section, we argue 
that this conceptual move has significant implications for how IPE understands the nature of 
state governance of capitalist society, which we term the politics of governing alienation. We 
begin by exploring the contradictory nature of this form of governance in the context of Bretton 
Woods, before exploring how this governing dilemma has been articulated within liberal 
political economy and then finally discussing how states are simultaneously pulled in opposing 
directions by the forces of world competition and national legitimacy.  
States in capitalist society are confronted by a dilemma. As Holloway (1995, p.124) 
argues, ‘there is a basic territorial non-coincidence’ between the global scale of capitalist social 
relations and the national boundaries of the state. Both territorial scales entail distinct, if 
interrelated, imperatives for the state. First, as discussed above, by plugging the national scale 
into the grid of world value relations through the convertibility of their currency, states 
contribute to an alienated system of endless competition. Particular governments must wield 
the state apparatus to successfully navigate these competitive pressures or face a range of 
impersonal sanctions. Second, governing legitimacy derives not just from the national 
economy’s success in competing on the world stage, but also from the state’s ostensible role as 
‘the embodiment of the general interest of society’ (Clarke, 1988, p.128). If governments fail 
egregiously to marshal state institutions to meet people’s demands, they face democratic 
sanctions at the ballot box or in the streets. The governance of alienation, we argue, signifies 
the need for states to reconcile their acquiescence to the alienated dictates of world competition 
with the construction of a legitimate national political project.  
Yet such reconciliation is fleeting, and pregnant with its own disintegration. The 
continual necessity to compete over labour productivity does not gel well with long-term, stable 
political projects. It is perhaps useful to briefly discuss the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the Bretton 
Woods system of global governance, as it is often understood as a successful attempt to embed 
16 
 
global competition within a political framework of mass democracy (Ruggie, 1982). This 
‘paradise lost’ (Eichengreen, 1994, p.1) was achieved by eliminating trade barriers and 
imposing currency convertibility, while allowing governments to somewhat insulate their 
national political projects from global economic forces through exchange rate adjustments, 
restrictions on capital mobility, and the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
aid states facing foreign exchange shortages (Cohen, 1977, pp.91-2). However, Bretton Woods’ 
actual operation reveals how many states faced an intensifying battle between the pressures of 
international competition – manifested in balance of payments deterioration, currency 
speculation, and shrinking reserves – and the demands of an enfranchised working class – 
expressed through electoral defeats, strikes, or riots. As Eichengreen (1994, p.2) observed, once 
the pent-up growth potential from the Depression and the Second World War had been 
exhausted, and barriers to global capital flows began to erode, governments again became ‘torn 
between the maintenance of external balance and financing objectives like Europe’s welfare 
state and America’s Vietnam War’. 
In Britain, this contradiction took the form of the ‘stop-go’ pattern of development 
(Brittan, 1971). During the ‘go’ period, British governments would stimulate demand in order 
to raise employment and protect their political legitimacy. Yet without a concurrent increase in 
national economic competitiveness, increased demand would tend to raise imports, putting 
pressure on the current account and depleting reserves. This would provoke speculation against 
the pound and a currency crisis would ensue. Governments would thus be forced to bring about 
a ‘stop’: monetary and fiscal policy would be tightened, economic contraction would ensue, 
and the balance of payments and reserves would recover (Cairncross, 1995, p.14). The cycle 
would then begin anew. While Britain was perhaps unique in its lack of long-term planning, 
even French dirigisme constituted an uneasy compromise that quickly began to come apart at 
the seams. The dirigiste state utilised an array of policy instruments to coordinate its 
nationalised industries and domestic financial system so as to wed France’s global economic 
performance with the mass politics of the Fifth Republic (Clift, 2017, p.517). Yet the failure to 
restrain domestic income growth gave rise to an inflation-prone economy that crippled national 
competitiveness, in turn necessitating frequent currency devaluations (Knapp and Wright, 2006, 
p.461). It became increasingly difficult to discipline labour in line with global productivity 
averages following the May 1968 upheavals. Torn between maintaining national 
competitiveness and social peace, French governments initiated a series of palliative measures, 
such as subsidies to failing sectors, which further eroded national competitiveness, bringing 
France to the precipice of economic unviability (Levy, 2008).  
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The contradictory nature of the governance of alienation – that is, the tension between 
the need for the state to both respond to global competition and maintain a legitimate, 
governable social order – is a central concern of liberal political economy. Indeed, for Smith 
(2001, p.947), the capitalist division of labour increases the nation’s opulence, yet it also 
engenders stark inequality that ‘excites the indignation of the poor’, which the state must temper 
through the creation of a legal and moral framework that socialises workers into commercial 
society. This trepidation is a continuous vein that runs through the liberal canon, yet the 
counterposed needs to adhere to world competitive dictates and assuage popular pressures are 
best articulated by two opposing poles of liberal thought: neo/ordoliberalism and 
Keynesianism. 
Neo/ordoliberalism conveys particularly well the state’s need to comply with the 
alienated pressures of global competition, and suggests a legal paradigm within which this could 
be achieved. For Hayek, the unconscious coordination of the market system – or ‘catallaxy’ – 
can only operate within a state-policed legal framework: ‘A catallaxy is thus the special kind 
of spontaneous order produced by the market through people acting within the rules of the law 
of property, tort and contract’ (1982, p.109). For ordoliberals, the state must ‘not allow itself to 
become the prey of the competing social interests’, nor beholden to a ‘mass democratic 
citizenry’ (Bonefeld, 2016, p.3). Instead, a strong, impartial state is required to provide the 
legislative basis to protect the economy from monopolies or excess democracy, and enforce 
market outcomes. Practically, this suggests a ‘rule-based (constitutional) framework’ in which 
government’s discretionary power is constrained through institutional safeguards (Feld, Köhler, 
and Nientiedt, 2015, p.2). Such safeguards should not simply be forged at the national level. 
Rather, neoliberals advocate a complex system of global governance, which Slobodian (2018) 
terms ‘ordoglobalism’, constituted by a multi-scalar layering of international treaties and 
supranational institutions that can fully ‘encase’ capitalism’s wiring from democratic 
interference. Take, for example, the case of state aid rules, which limit state support for private 
enterprises on the grounds that it distorts competition – a government may be prohibited from 
rescuing a failing business and staving off mass redundancies by European Union (EU) treaties 
or World Trade Organisation rules that are enshrined in its own national laws (Moraitis 2019). 
In this way, society’s tendency to shrink from the unrelenting discipline of capitalist 
competition can be comprehensively neutered. 
Yet according to a second strand of liberal thought, the neo/ordoliberal tradition is 
politically naive, as it is unable to deal with the question of legitimacy (Gamble, 1996, p.46; 
Gray, 2015). Keynesianism expresses an awareness of the spectre of revolt and a political will 
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to suspend market norms in order to palliate unrest. We refer here to Keynesianism not as a 
strict economic doctrine, but following Mann (2018), as a distinctly anxious strand of liberal 
thought that emerged from the French Revolution. Keynesianism, for Mann (ibid, p.95), 
understands that the politics of necessity cannot be suppressed through legislation: ‘The people 
must be fed, or they will do what is necessary to feed themselves’. Capitalism generates both 
misery and historically unprecedented levels of civilisation, yet the former always threatens to 
spill out of its confines and flood the latter. This requires a pragmatic, discretionary state acting 
to alleviate the worst destitution so as to avoid ‘the destruction of existing economic forms in 
their entirety’ (Keynes, 2013, p.380). The Keynesian impulse is further expressed through 
global governance initiatives, such as Bretton Woods’ attempt to protect national welfare states 
by restricting mobile capital flows. Yet it also takes the form of national violations of neoliberal 
global governance codes – for instance, European states’ breaking of EU budget rules so as to 
appease domestic constituencies (Kalan et al, 2018). However, this by no means suggests that 
Keynesianism is sympathetic to mass politics (Dunn, 2018). Rather, it shares with 
neo/ordoliberalism a desire for depoliticised economic governance, with the levers of demand 
management operated by ‘an insulated and bureaucratic élite’ (Bulpitt, 1986, p.27). This vein 
of liberalism, then, entrusts to enlightened technocrats the power to resist capitalism’s 
impersonal pressures, at certain crucial moments, in order to stave off popular upheaval.  
Both neo/ordoliberalism and Keynesianism express fundamental (if partial) truths about 
the politics of governing alienation. In attempting to marry an adherence to the autonomous 
logic of capitalism with the creation of a legitimate political project, state governance 
necessarily has recourse to strategies of technocratic discipline and palliation. In this sense, 
Keynesian critiques of the nefarious influence of neoliberal ideas on governments in the post-
Bretton Woods era and neoliberal critiques of the Keynesian roots of budgetary indiscipline are 
both incomplete. Neither are simply ‘dangerous ideas’ (Blyth 2013), but rather those tasked 
with the governance of capitalism tend to arrive at such conclusions as a matter of necessity. 
The depoliticisation of economic governance grants policy-makers autonomy from popular 
political pressures by establishing ‘automatic rules or pilots’ (Bulpitt, 1986, p.28). This allows 
governments to rationalise the domestic economy in line with world averages, without being 
impeded by political legitimacy concerns (Burnham, 2001; Krippner, 2011). Yet such strategies 
cannot banish legitimacy questions: faced with the social unrest generated by the dislocating 
effects of market competition, policy-makers are often forced to adopt ‘the activist, rationalist, 
crisis-fighting mindset of Keynesianism’ (Tooze, 2018). Governments thus seek to ‘buy time’ 
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by employing palliative measures that violate the norms of rules-based governance in order to 
appease popular forces (Streeck, 2014).  
This dual character of the governance of alienation, when it is recognised, is often 
framed sequentially. Most interpretations of Polanyi’s double movement describe a pendular 
dynamic, whereby periods of disembedded market discipline are followed by periods of re-
embedding in the name of social cohesion (Dale, 2012). However, strategies of depoliticised 
discipline and palliation are often implemented concurrently, as ad hoc, contradictory responses 
to the binding pressures of world value relations and national legitimacy. Such hybrid policy-
making can be observed in the actions of one of neoliberalism’s latest doyens.  
Argentina’s Mauricio Macri came to power in 2015 following the crisis of Argentina’s 
model of ‘export-oriented populism’ (Richardson, 2009), which had seen the governments of 
Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner use the dollar revenues from soybean 
exports during the 2000s commodity boom to fund a new ‘social contract’, including significant 
welfare provisions and state subsidies (Giraudo; 2019; Wylde, 2016; Murillo, 2015). These 
dollar revenues had balanced the fact that Argentina had been effectively frozen out of global 
credit markets since 2001. However, as the commodity boom’s end spelled the decreasing 
viability of this export-led strategy, Macri won the Presidency on a platform of delivering 
Argentina’s reinsertion into the world economy on competitive footing (Macri, 2016). His 
government sought to depoliticise the state apparatus, re-staffing economic ministries with 
‘well-regarded technocrats’ (The Economist, 2015). This would allow Macri to introduce a 
battery of reforms aiming to grant Argentina access to credit markets, lower the fiscal deficit, 
and ultimately raise national competitiveness. Outstanding debt obligations were settled, 
exchange controls abolished, import restrictions liberalised, interest rates raised, state subsidies 
slashed, and public sector redundancies announced; with further plans to liberalise labour 
markets and improve infrastructure (CSIS, 2019).  
Yet wary that too much economic pain would compromise his legitimacy and usher 
Kirchner back to power, Macri protected Kirchner-era welfare programmes – paid for through 
massive borrowing on global markets (Kerner, 2018). This gradualist approach failed. The 
peso’s value collapsed in spring and summer 2018, as world market sentiment soured in the 
face of Macri’s slow progress, forcing Argentina to negotiate an IMF loan (Mander, 2018). 
However, even under the political cover of IMF conditionalities, Macri was unable to 
implement a sudden austerity shock because of growing popular mobilisation against his 
reforms. In what The Economist (2019) termed his ‘last throw of the dice’, Macri resorted to 
price controls on ‘essential’ products to ease the population’s misery. However, this could not 
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prevent his poor performance in the August 2019 primary elections, after which his government 
unveiled another raft of social relief measures that provoked a further fall in the peso’s price, 
eventually leading to his ouster in the October general election (Mander and Smith, 2019; 
Mander and Stott, 2019). The Macri government, then, trapped between the twin pressures of 
the world market and national civil society, was forced to desperately operate the levers of both 
depoliticised discipline and palliation. Rather than signalling the exceptional nature of 
Argentina’s political economy, we argue that this case is an extreme illustration of a 
fundamental antinomy at the heart of the politics of governing alienation. 
This ‘moving contradiction’, we contend, is not well captured by the concept of the 
mutual constitution of states and markets nor by the notion of embeddedness (Marx, 1993, 
p.706). While markets can only exist within an institutional, legal, and cultural framework that 
is policed by states, the motion of markets cannot be reduced to this framework. Instead, 
following Marx’s account of alienation, the organisation of society along capitalistic lines 
creates an autonomous market logic that, while remaining wholly dependent for its functioning 
on the institutional arrangements of bourgeois society, nonetheless dominates that society. 
States’ efforts at governing this system should be understood as the governance of alienation, 
that is, the challenge of both ensuring the domestic economy’s viability within a context of 
unending global competition over labour productivity and meeting the citizenry’s demands 




Following the globalisation debate, IPE has come to challenge the dichotomous view of states 
and markets as engaged in a zero-sum struggle. Often aided by the Polanyian concept of 
embeddedness, a growing consensus has emerged around the mutual constitution of states and 
markets, whereby capitalism’s evolution is understood as the outcome of ‘contingent and 
deeply political processes of market-making and re-regulation’ (Clift, 2014, p.326). The 
different IPE strands examined here – CPE, constructivist, and neo-Polanyian – represent 
different articulations of the idea of a co-constitutive relation between states and markets. Yet 
acknowledging the complementarity of states and markets should not constitute IPE’s ‘final 
say’ on the matter. In fact, the market’s dependence on specific political practices and social 
norms is a central preoccupation, not only of Polanyian IPE, but of liberal theorists from Smith 
to Hayek. The ‘political embeddedness’ of markets thus risks becoming a ‘commonplace’ 
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notion if not situated within the context of capitalism’s historically novel alienated logic (Dale, 
2011, p.331). If acknowledging the mutual constitution of states and markets constitutes the 
first step of any serious IPE analysis, the second must be to examine the dynamics that their co-
constitution unleashes. 
Τo elucidate these dynamics, we advanced a ‘value-form’ reading of Marx’s concept of 
alienation, which understands the capitalist economy as the product of definite social practices 
that nevertheless lock social actors into a compelling developmental logic. In the capitalist 
market, money-mediated exchange commensurates different goods according to a universal 
yardstick: the mean labour time socially required for their production. Market exchange 
generates ‘a competitive scramble to meet or exceed average levels of productivity’ established 
internationally as firms are compelled to stay in line with world market prices (McNally, 1993, 
p.179). This process of competitive commensuration can only occur through the state’s 
sanctioning of a domestically unique and internationally convertible currency that links 
domestic industry to foreign competition. Inadvertently, states themselves become subject to 
impersonal competitive forces, as nationally produced wealth is evaluated in relation to the 
productivity standards of the world market. States become the architects of their own alienation 
as their market-making power creates abstract competitive dictates that they must struggle to 
comply with. 
This has profound implications for the conceptualisation of state governance of 
capitalism, which is not adequately captured by the mutual constitution literature. What this 
article has termed the politics of governing alienation entails a peculiar dilemma whereby states 
must synchronise the domestic economy with the pace of the world market while ensuring the 
governability of the domestic social order. This anxiety is at the heart of liberal governance and 
is expressed by the neo/ordoliberal and Keynesian traditions, with the former articulating the 
market’s need for a ‘strong state’ to insulate the workings of the economy from excess 
democracy and the latter stressing the necessity of technocratic palliation to defer the political 
ramifications of pauperisation. Both strands of liberalism articulate correctly, but one-sidedly, 
the tensions encountered by political elites when formulating a single national project that 
abides by global productivity averages and the needs of civil society. 
In an attempt to overcome the limitations of the state retreat thesis, the mutual 
constitution literature rightly sheds light on the state’s market-making powers. It misses, 
however, the fundamentally abstract and impersonal form of power that characterises the global 
economy, which lies neither within the market’s nor the state’s hands, but is ultimately 
exercised upon both market agents and policy-makers by the socially established productivity 
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standards of the world market. Although global competition is sustained through the actions of 
states, it simultaneously constitutes an alienated, externally-imposed imperative, as the 
antagonistic conditions of the global market compel national economies to produce ‘within 
time’ to secure their own survival.  
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